By Jürgen Habermas
El concepto de "presuposición idealizante" ocupa un lugar destacado en los angeles construcción de l. a. "teoría de l. a. acción comunicativa". En este ensayo, que constituye una importante aportación a su teoría, Habermas explica y desarrolla este concepto, reinterpretándolo, a l. a. luz de su análisis pragmático-formal, como una versión de las "ideas" kantianas una vez liberadas de su sentido transcendental. El texto ofrece una explicación genealógica de los vínculos que unen el planteamiento kantiano con cuatro presuposiciones pragmáticas inevitables en los angeles acción comunicativa: un mundo objetivo común, los angeles responsabilidad de los sujetos racionales, l. a. validez incondicional de las pretensiones de verdad y de corrección normativa, y los angeles necesaria dependencia de justificación discursiva. Habermas destaca que l. a. "inevitabilidad" de estas presuposiciones en los angeles acción comunicativa debe entenderse más en el sentido de Wittgenstein que en el de Kant, es decir, no en el sentido trascendental de las condiciones universales y necesarias de l. a. experiencia posible, sino en el sentido gramatical de un sistema de lenguaje y un mundo de l. a. vida en el que nos hemos socializado y que, en cualquier caso, "para nosotros" es insuperable. A los angeles luz de esos nexos genealógicos se hacen patentes los puntos cruciales en los que l. a. filosofía analítica ha rechazado los angeles herencia de las "ideas" de los angeles razón pura de Kant. Pero, a su vez, mediante un análisis que examina l. a. crítica de Frege al psicologismo, el principio de caridad interpretativa de Davidson, l. a. recepción crítica de Wittgenstein por parte de Dummett, y los angeles concepción del entendimiento como un intercambio discursivo de razones que propone Brandom, Habermas muestra que los angeles tradición analítica acaba llegando a unas descripciones normativas de l. a. práctica lingüística muy similares a las de su pragmática formal, de raíces confesadamente kantianas.
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Reviewed through David Ripley, collage of Connecticut
In the 1st part or so of this publication, Kevin Scharp argues first that the concept that of fact (understood the following as one whose constitutive rules, taken jointly, have a few fake results (p. 36)) is inconsistent; moment that it's thereby incorrect to be used in 'serious theorizing' (p. 134); and eventually that it may get replaced with (consistent) successor options designed in order to do the theoretical paintings we need fact to do. He devotes the rest of the booklet to the presentation, dialogue, and deployment of a specific pair of such successor suggestions, which he dubs ascending fact and descending truth.
Chapter 1 speedy surveys the giant philosophical literature on fact, dividing it into camps: 'philosophical approaches', which specialise in the character of fact itself, and 'logical approaches', which specialise in constructing formal structures and tend to be paradox-focused. bankruptcy 2 offers a thought of inconsistent thoughts. those are strategies with a few fake constitutive rules; what it truly is for a precept to be constitutive for an idea is naturally additionally thought of. (For Scharp, it truly is for possessors of the idea that to have default (and defeasible) entitlement to the primary. )
Chapters three and four start the flip to fact particularly, and make the case that fact is an inconsistent inspiration. bankruptcy three specializes in what Scharp calls 'the seen argument' for truth's inconsistency: the argument to contradiction in line with the liar paradox. This calls for that fact obey the common T-schema T〈φ〉↔ φ for all sentences φ (in specific, for the liar sentence itself), the place T is the reality predicate and〈φ〉is a reputation of φ. Scharp divides the T-schema into its part rules T〈φ〉→ φ (which I'll name 'release') and φ → T〈φ〉(which I'll name 'capture'), and argues, dependent partially on their an important function in truth's use as a tool of endorsement, that those ideas are constitutive for the concept that fact. 'The seen argument' additionally is dependent upon the reasoning within the established argument to contradiction being legitimate, and he argues for this declare besides (I will go back to this below). bankruptcy four bargains extra arguments for truth's inconsistency, all established round the phenomenon of revenge.
Chapter five starts off from the concept fact is an inconsistent idea, and argues that it may for this reason get replaced, a minimum of for a few reasons. This comprises dialogue of, and arguments opposed to, different theories of fact that carry it to be inconsistent yet don't suggest changing it.
Chapter 6 starts off the confident undertaking of the ebook; in it Scharp develops what he calls the 'prescriptive theory' of fact. this can be the place the replacements that Scharp commends to us -- which he calls 'ascending truth' and 'descending truth' (on which extra lower than) -- are constructed and explored. bankruptcy 7 turns to reflections on method. the following Scharp spells out what he calls 'metrological naturalism', a Davidson-inspired method of philosophical method that is helping us see tips on how to use specific options with out delivering an research of them (in this example, utilized to ascending fact and descending truth).
In bankruptcy eight Scharp considers many of the theoretical makes use of fact serves for us, in theories of facts, objectivity, which means, reference, and so on. , and argues that ascending and descending fact can serve those reasons in addition. this can be an important to his total undertaking; if ascending and descending fact can't serve those reasons, then changing fact with them will be no larger than just throwing fact away and preventing there. during this bankruptcy, Scharp adapts a selected variety of truth-conditional semantics (which I'll abbreviate TCS) for average languages (based on Predelli 2005) to the current surroundings, changing it to ascending-truth-and-descending-truth-conditional semantics (which I'll abbreviate ATDTCS).
In bankruptcy nine Scharp turns to 'descriptive theory' -- how are we to appreciate what usual audio system suggest once they declare that whatever is right? (And extra more often than not, how are we to appreciate traditional makes use of of inconsistent options? ) right here Scharp deploys the ATDTCS he develops within the prior bankruptcy. Its deployment for this function, notwithstanding, doesn't really depend upon the shift from TCS to ATDTCS; his conception of inconsistent suggestions may possibly simply besides take delivery of in a TCS formula (where it'll volume to a specific variety of assessment-sensitive theory). besides the fact that, Scharp has already argued that fact is incorrect for severe theorizing, and so is obliged to interchange TCS with ATDTCS.
Finally, bankruptcy 10 sums up, contemplating existence after 'the aletheic revolution' (that is, after fact is changed with the crew of ascending fact and descending truth), and responding to a couple power objections.
Replacing fact is wealthy and deeply lucrative, and that i won't have the ability to do it complete justice right here; as an alternative, i'll aspect to a few of the explanations I'm fascinated about it.
I suspect idea of inconsistent strategies (or whatever within the sector, in any case) is important for figuring out various philosophical (and different) puzzles. Scharp's cautious and persuasive paintings on inconsistent recommendations (particularly in Chapters 2 and nine) repays learn and might be extensively acceptable. This dialogue could be of curiosity to philosophers of language and ideas relatively normally, whether they are all in favour of fact or paradox. Scharp's method of inconsistent ideas doesn't itself require (although it truly is required via) the book's method of truth.
Scharp's transparent realization to methodological concerns is usually very welcome. In a few regular discussions (particularly logical discussions) of fact and paradoxes, it will probably occasionally be doubtful no matter if the radical formal structures offered are meant as concepts for revisions in our perform with the reality predicate (Scharp's 'prescriptive theory' serves this purpose), or as innovations for revisions in our knowing of our present perform (Scharp's 'descriptive theory' serves this purpose). Scharp by no means falls into this unclarity, and develops transparent, fascinating, and specified options of either kinds. This advances separate (but overlapping) debates, either by means of contributing to them and via making plainer simply how exact they are.
This is even sooner than we get to the book's major thrust: the arguments for changing fact, and the proposed replacements. those too are wealthy and lucrative, and that i will have interaction in brief with a number of elements of them under. yet fairly, if this sort of factor is in any respect your bag, learn the booklet; there's much in it worthy it slow. I'm simply going as a way to comic strip a number of fragments here.
The argument for replacement
Scharp's major argument (the 'obvious argument') that fact is an inconsistent idea is predicated at the liar paradox in a well-known method: because there's a legitimate argument to contradiction from truth's constitutive rules, fact has to be an inconsistent thought. to ensure that the most obvious argument to paintings, it is important that proposed resolutions of the liar paradox don't reach resolving it. fact needs to be really inconsistent for Scharp's method of paintings. for the reason that nearly not anyone thinks that a couple of proposed answer is plausible (and many people doubt it's even that many! ), every one of Scharp's conclusions the following (this process doesn't paintings, that process doesn't paintings, and so forth. ) may be congenial to so much readers.
Nonetheless, i need to target one element of the final argument, and recommend that anything is amiss. the difficulty arises in Scharp's attention of ways to fact in response to nonclassical logics. As he issues out (p. 81), no nontrivial logical procedure (with a wealthy adequate concept of syntax) can settle for all of one) modus ponens and conditional evidence (for a similar conditional connective), 2) 'the usual structural principles for derivability' (in specific transitivity and contraction), and three) seize and release.
Scharp additionally argues right here that modus ponens and conditional facts are constitutive rules of the conditional, and that transitivity and contraction are constitutive of 'the derivability operator' (p. 81). He had prior argued that the seize and liberate are constitutive of fact. therefore, the constitutive ideas of these types of issues taken jointly yield triviality, so that they can't all be right. Assuming the conclusions of Scharp's part arguments, both the conditional, or validity, or fact should have a few mistaken constitutive ideas, and so be an inconsistent inspiration. yet why is he so certain it's truth?
The solution turns out to have anything to do with attaining definitely the right point of generality, specifically ensuring to not overgeneralize. Scharp offers:
the case for adopting a non-classical good judgment . . . . shouldn't be made via attempting to accommodate the constitutive rules of a few different idea that is classically inconsistent. i believe this aspect will be made opposed to any try to adjust our common sense within the face of paradoxes. yes, lets accomplish that, yet this stream is a "language-wide" switch, this means that arguments having not anything to do with the idea that in query (truth in our case) that have been formerly thought of legitimate, will grow to be invalid. (p. 81)
For instance, to assert that modus ponens is the misguided constitutive precept might impact our theories of validity around the board, even if no paradoxes are involved.
I totally recommend the need to not overgeneralize, to maintain our methods to paradox from ramifying too generally and 'fixing' what wasn't damaged. I fear, notwithstanding, that Scharp's truth-focused strategy has the other challenge: it undergeneralizes, lacking universal gains among paradoxes that do and paradoxes that don't contain truth.
Let's wear our inspector hats and get away the magnifying glasses. There's a wave of paradoxes sweeping the town, and we have to locate the perpetrator ahead of they strike back. There are liar paradoxes and curry paradoxes, restricted-quantification curries (Beall et al. , 2006) and validity curries (Shapiro, 2011; Beall and Murzi, 2013), russells and Hinnion-Liberts (Hinnion and Libert, 2003; Restall, 2013), all with a standard modus operandi. 
To slender down our checklist of suspects, it is sensible to invite: Who used to be at each of the crime scenes? utilizing this technique, logical vocabulary all comes out within the transparent. It's no longer negation; he was once out of city while the curries occurred. It's now not the conditional; she was once nowhere close to the liars (assuming, besides, that negation isn't simply the conditional with a fake moustache on). yet fact comes out within the transparent too: it's received a pretty good alibi for the russells, the Hinnion-Liberts, and the validity curries (as good as knowers and Montagues). in truth, there are just characters that occur in any respect of the crime scenes: contraction and transitivity, either issues Scharp claims are constitutive for validity. we should always be very definite certainly that validity isn't our perpetrator earlier than we spend an excessive amount of time harassing truth.
Since contraction and transitivity either observe to our whole language, the concern of overgeneralization certainly returns; with out this sort of, won't our reasoning be crippled around the board, even if paradoxes don't threaten in any respect? yet at the very least with regards to transitivity, this can be demonstrably no longer so: there are nontransitive logics that validate all classically-valid arguments including an absolutely naive conception of fact, whereas last nontrivial (see, e. g. , Ripley, 2013). Given Scharp's different perspectives, then, I reckon he may still take heavily the concept it really is validity, instead of fact, that's an inconsistent suggestion -- certainly the inconsistent idea on the center of the paradoxes. (Scharp in short considers the concept validity is inconsistent (p. 218), yet for various purposes, and with out pursuing it. )
The proffered replacements
Having argued that fact can be changed, Scharp proposes to interchange it with a couple of innovations: ascending fact and descending fact. The names are possibly deceptive; neither of those thoughts is a type of fact in any respect -- that's the complete element! that's, regardless of the names, being ascending actual and being descending real should not methods of being real; they're different statuses completely. (Scharp occasionally speaks of 'ascending and descending truth', but when we're being cautious this could strike us similar to 'The League of and The United Nations'. )
Scharp provides an axiomatisation, which he calls ADT, of ascending and descending fact. (ADT isn't really intended to be the complete tale approximately ascending and descending fact, yet fairly a massive sub-story (p. 153). ) in line with ADT, the declare that φ is descending real, which I'll write D〈φ〉, is at the very least as robust as φ itself, yet most likely more desirable. The declare that φ is ascending actual, which I'll write A〈φ〉, is a minimum of as vulnerable as φ itself, yet probably weaker. that's, D〈φ → φ and φ → A〈φ〉 are theorems of ADT, yet their converses usually are not. furthermore, ascending and descending fact are duals; a sentence is descending actual iff its negation isn't really ascending actual, and ascending actual iff its negation isn't really descending precise. (This is just a small a part of ADT; I won't current the axiomatisation in complete right here, yet will in its place concentration simply on a few of its extra notable gains. )
It is feasible to work out during this a 'splitting' of the commonplace T-schema, T〈φ〉↔ φ. Descending fact takes over the left-to-right course of this equivalence, and ascending fact takes over the right-to-left path. (Ascending fact 'captures' yet doesn't 'release'; descending fact 'releases' yet doesn't 'capture'. ) it may be tempting to imagine (and it really is occasionally real) that different favourite alethic rules will paintings like this besides, yet this isn't continuously so; a few care is needed. for instance, we often anticipate a fact predicate to validate the followingconjunction schema: (T φ ∧ T〈ψ〉) ↔ T〈φ ∧ ψ〉. The instructions of this schema, even though, aren't break up among ascending and descending fact; neither of them validates the left-to-right path of the conjunction schema, whereas either validate the right-to-left path as an alternative. (The left-to-right path is secured on a combined studying: (D〈φ〉∧ D〈ψ) → A〈φ ∧ ψ〉is a theorem (p. 171). )
As the instance of the conjunction schema exhibits, neither ascending nor descending fact is closed less than multi-premise validity (since φ, ψ ⊢ φ ∧ ψ); neither is both of them closed less than single-premise validity. nor is even closed below substitute of logical equivalents (p. 173). that's, there are sentences φ and ψ such that φ ↔ ψ is a theorem, and D〈φ〉is a theorem, yet D〈ψ〉is now not. (In truth, there are instances like this the place ¬D〈ψ〉is a theorem. for instance, allow φ be an axiom of ADT, and permit ψ be the 'descending liar' mentioned under. ) this may take a few being used to.
A sentence φ is 'safe' iff A〈φ〉→ D〈φ〉; for secure sentences, ascending fact and descending fact are an identical (since D〈φ〉→ A〈φ〉 is a theorem of ADT for each φ), and because φ is usually sandwiched among D〈φ〉and A〈φ〉, it too is akin to those while it truly is secure. For secure sentences, then, we will be able to ignore the excellence among ascending and descending fact, and deal with them (more or much less) as we might deal with fact, have been it current. (For instance, the place φ ∧ ψ is secure, descending fact will fulfill the entire conjunction schema above; the place either φ and ψ are secure, ascending fact will. ) yet for hazardous sentences φ, there are 3 separate claims to maintain music of: D〈φ〉, A〈φ〉, and φ itself.
Scharp proves that ADT is constant (relative to ZFC) model-theoretically, via constructing constructions he calls 'xeno models'. those are a section kludgey: they mix local versions for modal common sense with extra formula-indexed accessibility family with revision sequences on best. yet regardless of the kitchen-sink nature of Scharp's consistency facts, it really is quite user-friendly to get a think for a way ADT remains constant: it's a mix of a classical glut conception and a classical hole idea (see box, 2008 for discussion).
To see what I suggest, think of the 'descending liar': a sentence δ that's ¬D〈δ〉. If δ is descending real, then it isn't descending actual (since D〈φ〉→ φ for any φ, and because δ says that it's not descending true); so it isn't descending actual. we have now proved δ itself. yet this can be the place it stops; there's no strategy to get to any difficulty from the following, due to the fact that there isn't any approach to finish from δ itself that δ is descending true.
Taking inventory, δ is ascending precise yet no longer descending precise; it really is detrimental. like any harmful sentences, its negation can also be detrimental. (If ¬φ is secure, then ¬φ is both descending real or it's not ascending precise. If ¬φ is descending real, then φ can't be ascending real, due to the fact A and D are twin, and so φ is secure. If ¬φ isn't really ascending real, then φ is descending actual, on the grounds that A and D are twin, and so φ is secure. ) that's, each damaging sentence is such that either it and its negation are ascending actual, and neither it nor its negation is descending actual. ADT, whereas totally classical, is a idea of ascending gluts and descending gaps; the damaging sentences fall into those categories.
Like all classical glut and classical hole theories, then, it has a few sticky issues round the paradoxes. it's not like δ and its negation have an identical prestige in ADT; finally, δ is a theorem of ADT (and its negation, for this reason, can't be additional to ADT on ache of contradiction). yet this distinction in prestige can't be mentioned in ADT itself; either δ and its negation are ascending actual, nor is descending real, and people are the single proper statuses that may be stated. What, then, is the variation among them? it sort of feels transparent: based on ADT, δ is right, yet its negation isn't. yet ADT has been designed to not manage to show this.
Note, during this connection, that Scharp's proposed ATDTCS can't get at this contrast both: δ and its negation (or their ordinary language equivalents) have exactly the comparable ascending and descending fact stipulations as one another. (They are either continuously ascending actual, and not descending actual. ) but they have to range in that means, seeing that one is right, and the opposite isn't really. It doesn't require 'true' to specific the purpose. the next schema might be very average for a consistentist like Scharp: 'if φ and ¬ψ, then 〈φ〉 and 〈ψ〉 range in meaning'. yet this precept is incompatible with ATDTCS, given ADT.
We also needs to anticipate ADT, as a classical gap/glut concept, to stand problems approximately truth's position as a tool of endorsement; and this expectation is born out. Scharp makes a couple of claims in changing fact. between them is the declare that δ isn't descending precise (p. 173); that's, between them is δ itself. feel i would like to advise the contents of Scharp's e-book with out repeating the whole thing myself. How am i able to do it, after the aletheic revolution? i can't say 'Everything during this booklet is descending true'; this can be to disagree with the contents of the booklet, end result of the dangerous sentences asserted in it (together with the claims that they're unsafe). yet descending fact is Scharp's proposed alternative for fact in its position as a tool of endorsement (p. 174).
Ascending fact won't paintings as a tool of endorsement both -- announcing that anything is ascending actual is simply too vulnerable to count number as endorsing it -- and Scharp doesn't provide it as one. He does suggest ascending fact to be used in rejection, yet duality guarantees it has an analogous challenge in rejections as descending fact does in endorsements.
In locations, Scharp recognizes those difficulties yet minimizes them ('there is not any such factor as a constant real machine of endorsement. Descending fact is as shut as you'll [consistently] get' (p. 281)). in other places, he leaves them offstage solely ('ascending and descending fact, jointly, can practice truth's expressive position. that's, they could function units of endorsement and rejection' (p. 156, the place damaging sentences are a great deal dialectically relevant)).
It is necessary, notwithstanding, to maintain those barriers in brain, relatively simply because they aren't non-compulsory. it's not as if, had Scharp basically been extra shrewdpermanent, he can have designed constant replacements that meet his different desiderata and nonetheless absolutely serve truth's expressive function; no such replacements are attainable. there's simply no manner, the way in which Scharp proceeds, to take away the inconsistency from fact with no even as removal a few of its usefulness. exchanging fact, like exchanging fact, is and has to be fraught with compromise.
Despite this, i locate the ebook very effective to interact with; its imaginative and prescient, readability of function, and creativity all are available in huge measures. even if I'm beautiful definite exchanging Truth's method of the paradoxes is barking up the inaccurate tree, I'm additionally convinced I'll be returning to the booklet for a while; Scharp's voice is crucial during this conversation.
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Beall, J. and Murzi, J. (2013). flavors of Curry's paradox. magazine of Philosophy, 110(3):143-165.
Field, H. (2008). Saving fact from Paradox. Oxford college Press, Oxford.
Hinnion, R. and Libert, T. (2003). optimistic abstraction and extensionality. magazine of Symbolic common sense, 68(3): 828-836.
Predelli, S. (2005). Contexts: which means, fact, and using Language. Oxford college Press, Oxford.
Priest, G. (2002). past the boundaries of inspiration. Oxford collage Press, Oxford.
Restall, G. (2013). statement, denial, and non-classical theories. In Tanaka, ok. , Berto, F. , Mares, E. , and Paoli, F. , editors, Paraconsistency: good judgment and purposes, pp. 81-100. Springer, Dordrecht.
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This 'common' is naturally contentious. specifically, Graham Priest's 'inclosure schema' (Priest, 2002) attracts a vivid line among liars and their kin on one aspect and curries and their relations at the different. i'd make an analogous objection, then, to the inclosure schema.
 This 'common' is naturally contentious. particularly, Graham Priest's 'inclosure schema' (Priest, 2002) attracts a shiny line among liars and their family members on one aspect and curries and their relations at the different. i'd make an identical objection, then, to the inclosure schema.
Although the paradigm of modernist development has been challenged on many fronts, Erasmus and different sixteenth-century figures are nonetheless normally considered as those who led the transition from a spiritual heart a long time to a extra godless smooth period. by way of examining the lives, paintings, and correspondence of Erasmus, Thomas extra, Margaret extra Roper, Reginald Pole, Gasparo Contarini, and Vittoria Colonna, this e-book demonstrates how those Catholic women and men of letters created a particular type of non secular neighborhood rooted in friendship and spiritualized scholarship.
A provocative shut analyzing revealing an intensive, proto-phenomenological Socrates.
Modern interpreters of Plato’s Socrates have quite often taken the dialogues to be geared toward figuring out goal fact. Attending heavily to the texts of the early dialogues and the query of advantage specifically, Sean D. Kirkland means that this process is flawed—that such crisis with researching exterior evidence rests on sleek assumptions that will were faraway from the minds of Socrates and his contemporaries. This isn’t, even though, to accuse Socrates of any form of relativism. via cautious research of the unique Greek and of a number competing strands of Plato scholarship, Kirkland as an alternative brings to gentle an intensive, proto-phenomenological Socrates, for whom “what advantage is” is what has constantly already seemed as virtuous in daily event of the area, whether preliminary appearances are unsatisfactory or imprecise and short of better scrutiny and explanation.
- Deleuze: The Clamor of Being
- The Idea of Hegel's "Science of Logic"
- Nietzsche: The Meaning of Earth
- Passionate Being: Language, Singularity and Perseverance
- Lonergan and the Philosophy of Historical Existence (ERIC VOEGELIN INST SERIES) by Thomas J. McPartland (2000-07-20)
Extra info for Acción comunicativa y razón sin transcendencia
Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving now? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? . Are we not straying as through an inﬁnite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not night and more night coming on all the while? The “madman” concludes by wondering: “How shall we, murderers of all murderers, comfort ourselves? What was holiest and most powerful of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives? . Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us?
And 2. Thessalonians; there are also some remarks about Ephesians). There is no hint here yet 24 ■ Preparations that the experience of religion is conﬁned only to an ontic domain and is not relevant to the ontological structures of existence. In fact, much of the terminology later employed in Being and Time to speak of the ontological being of Dasein is here used to depict Paul’s experience or that of his audience. Thus, although these lectures played little if any role in the use of phenomenology to speak of religious phenomena and certainly their appropriation of phenomenological terminology for a depiction of religious life was soon rejected by Heidegger, they may indicate that at least at one point in Heidegger’s path such an application was possible and that it may indeed be recovered by other thinkers.
Caputo characterizes the postmodern in characteristically gripping fashion: All of that [the developments that produced postmodernism] eﬀectively put a lot of what the Enlightenment was trying to sell us on the run, and good riddance. Good riddance to the idea of pure worldless and solipsistic subjects, to the ideal of pure presuppositionless science, to a pure prelinguistic world, to pure objects, to pure consciousness, and to pure reason. Give us some good old-fashioned impure thoughts! The world is a lot more complicated than the moderns think, a lot messier, less well-programmed, less rule-governed, more open-ended and open-textured.